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Abstract
To analyze the nuances of the root concept of neutral in social networks, we
focus on several related interpretations and suggest corresponding mathemati-
cal models for each of them from the family of information-sharing multi-agents
network games known as Voter models and the Naming Games (NG). We solve
the case of the strong neutrals known as the middle-roaders for global quantities
such as expected times to consensus and local times. By using generating func-
tions and treating the two extreme and middle opinions in this modification as a
two balls, three urns version of the Voter model, we give closed-form expressions
for the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of its Markov propagator. This modifica-
tion of the two-opinions Naming Games is applicable to the roles and behaviour
of neutrals in social forums or blogs, and represent a significant departure from
the linguistic roots of the original NG.
1. Introduction
The Naming Games have been widely studied as a class of effective models
for information sharing and opinion spread in social networks. Naming Games
were first introduced in linguistics to model the convergence of social names or
tags to a small or even single label [1], [2]. In the two opinions subclass (where
the opinions or signals are denoted A and B) of the NG, the original model
treats the neutrals as agents who have equal probability of signalling A or B.
Thus, a speaker - listener pair chosen from the neutrals can either exit as a pair
of purely A or B opinions agents. The neutral speaker has half probability of
signalling A which is assumed to be received by the neutral listener with full
fidelity who then, along with the speaker, becomes a purely A opinion agent.
The same holds if the speaker signals the opinion B in which case, both speaker
and listener switch from neutrals to purely B.
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One of the previous point of departure from this original NG [3] is the
listener-only version (LO-NG) analyzed in [4, 5] where the asymmetry between
speaker and listener is changed significantly to empower the speaker in the sense
that only the listener may switch to a different opinion type in a single time
step. This was done at first to simplify the mathematical analysis of the NG
but we emphasize another important aspect of the LO-NG, namely, that it more
closely resemble social opinion dynamics and information sharing and less the
original linguistic applications of the NG. Arguably, the agent that speaks is the
more pro-active of the pair and seeks to convince the other of his opinions.
One aim in this paper is to analyze the nuances of the root concept of
neutral in sociology settings where the above speaker - listener protocol have a
range of asymmetry. We focus on three related interpretations of this concept,
namely, (a) undecided as in binary elections or referendums to choose between
two candidates A, B, (b) middle-roaders as in blogs or social forums on a single
issue with FOR and AGAINST as the extreme opinions and possibly several
intermediate opinions in between them, such as in the issue of gun control,
and (c) erratic or flippant as in the listener only (LO-NG) versions of the two-
opinions NG where the neutrals or AB agents speak the either opinion A or B
with fixed probabilities.
Clearly, for category (a) the undecided neutrals (AB) will be more reluctant
to speak than the decided agents (A or B), and this could be formalized by
neutrals never chosen as speakers, only as listeners in the associated game.
Otherwise, the interactions are the same as in the LO-NG.
In category (b) the middle-roaders in social forums say, are neither undecided
nor flippant, but rather, are very likely to be staunch believers in their middle
opinion or opinions (AB). This neutral behaviour can be formalized by what
we call the M models, where the agents are divided into two disjoint classes,
namely, (1) the extremers who hold the extreme opinions (A or B), convert other
extremers to the opposite extreme opinion, and are converted to middle-roaders
only by (single or multiple) exposure to the Devil’s Advocacy of middle-roaders
given next, and (2) the middle-roader neutrals who do not interact with other
neutrals, play the Devil’s Advocate when speaking to extremers ( eg, speak B
to an A extremer or vice-versa), and when listening to an A(resp. B) extremer
(once or multiple times) converts to the corresponding extreme opinion.
To put (b) into a wider context, we add for completeness another category
(c) of middle-roader neutral behaviour who not only play the Devil’s Advocate
when speaking to extremers, but when listening once or more times to an A
(resp. B) extremer converts to the other extreme opinion B (resp. A).
The original LO-NG fits into this classification in the category (d) of neu-
trals (AB) who are flippant (randomly speak A or B) when speaking to both
other neutrals and extremers, and when listening, converts to the extremer type
corresponding to the signal received. In this same category, the extremers con-
sistently speak their associated opinion, and when listening, convert to flippant
neutrals upon receiving the opposite extreme opinion.
Finally, again for the sake of being more complete, we describe the category
(e) which differs from the flippant neutral (LO-NG) only in the perverse con-
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version of a neutral (AB) to the opposite B (resp. A) extremer when receiving
signal A (resp. B), irrespective of the speaker.
There are more categories and the complete list can be tabulated according
to different versions of the two-body three urns models [6]. It seems that only
the case (b) of middle-roaders can be solved exactly in the sense of diagonalizing
the Markov transition matrix in closed form by using the generating functions
method pioneered by Kac in his solution of the Ehrenfest Urn Problem [7].
Moreover, as shown below it is equivalent to the 3-Voter model.
In the rest of the paper, we will solve the M-models exactly to compute
for large network1s, expected times to consensus. The results obtained here,
without using the Diffusion Approximation or Fokker-Planck Master equation,
but rather from direct probabilistic calculations at the level of random walks,
agree with those in [8]. Moreover, our calculations below can be extended for
all values of M including the smallest case M = 3 which is of special interest
here because of its equivalence to the scenario (b) of middle-roaders neutrals in
social dialog and blogs.
The M models will be solved exactly to prove the result that starting from a
population of N/3 agents in any one of the M microstates including the M − 2
neutral ones, the expected times to consensus, τ = O(N2) is much longer than
the O(NlogN) expected consensus times for the two-opinions LO-NG model in
scenario (c) for erratic neutrals [4], [5].
2. Random Walk Model
We assume that the model is imposed on a complete graph. That is, every
node is connected to every other node in the network. Let nA(m), nB(m), and
nC(m) be the total number of nodes with opinions A, B, and C respectively
at discrete time step m. Since the total number of nodes in the graph, N , is
constant, we can eliminate nC by taking nC(m) = N−nA(m)−nB(m). So, the
probability distribution of macrostates (nA(m) = i, nB(m) = j) at time step
m+ 1 can be expressed in terms of information given at time m as
a
(m+1)
ij =p
A
i−1ja
(m)
i−1j + p
A
i+1ja
(m)
i+1j + p
B
ij−1a
(m)
ij−1 + p
B
ij+1a
(m)
ij+1
+ pA−Bi−1j+1a
(m)
i−1j+1 + p
A−B
i+1j−1a
(m)
i+1j−1 + rija
(m)
ij .
(1)
where
pAij = q
A
ij =
i(N−i−j)
N(N−1) p
B
ij = q
B
ij =
j(N−i−j)
N(N−1)
pA−Bij = q
A−B
ij =
ij
N(N−1) rij = 1− 2p
A
ij − 2p
A−B
ij .
(2)
Each pair (i, j) in equation (1) corresponds to a row of the Markov transition
matrix, T. The m step propagator, a
(m)
ij , can be found by multiplying the initial
distribution, a
(0)
ij , in vector form by the matrix T
m. We will find the m step
propagator analytically by solving the spectral problem for the matrix T.
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3. The Spectral Problem
We extend the procedure found in ref. [6] for the 3 opinion Voter model
on the complete graph. For eigenvalue λ and corresponding eigenvector v with
components cij , the spectral problem can be stated as
(λ− 1)cij =p
A
i−1jci−1j + p
A
i+1jci+1j + p
B
ij−1cij−1 + p
B
ij+1cij+1 + p
A−B
i−1j+1ci−1j+1
+ pA−Bi+1j−1ci+1j−1 − (2p
A
ij + 2p
B
ij + 2p
A−B
ij )cij .
(3)
To solve this, we introduce a generating function G(x, y, z) defined by
G(x, y, z) =
∑
i
∑
j
cijx
iyjzN−i−j . (4)
The double sum is over all pairs (i, j) ∈ Z2, however we force the restriction
that cij = 0 when i < 0, j < 0 or i+ j > N . These restrictions are equivalent to
the requirement that there cannot be any negative powers in G. Using these, we
express the spectral problem in equation (3) as a PDE in generating function
form:
(x − z)2Gxz + (y − z)
2Gyz + (x− y)
2Gxy = N(N − 1)(λ− 1)G. (5)
To solve this, make the change of variables u = x−y, v = y−z, and H(u, v, z) =
G(x, y, z). Since this is a linear change of variables, we expect H to have the
same form as G, except with coefficients bij . The PDE for the spectral problem
expressed in the new variables becomes
(u2 +2uv)Huz − 2uvHuv + v
2Hvz − v
2Hvv − u
2Huu = N(N − 1)(λ− 1)H. (6)
This difference equation for the coefficients of H can be written explicitly as
bij =
(N − i− j + 1)[(i− 1)bi−1j + (j − 1)bij−1]
N(N − 1)(λ− 1) + (i+ j)(i + j − 1)
. (7)
To find the eigenvalues and eigenvectors, we only consider the cases in which
equation (7) becomes singular for some i = i′, j = j′. This is possible only
when the denominator in equation (7) is zero at this point. This shows that for
i′, j′ = 0...N, i′ + j′ ≤ N , the set of eigenvalues is
λi′j′ = 1−
(i′ + j′)(i′ + j′ − 1)
N(N − 1)
. (8)
If we take λ = λi′j′ , then bi′j′ can take any value. This is a reflection of the
fact that any multiple of an eigenvector remains an eigenvector with the same
eigenvalue. Without loss in generality, take bi′j′ = 1. Now, for i > i
′, and
j > j′, equation (7) will never be singular and non-trivial. This will determine
all of the values of bij for any λi′j′ .
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Now we find cij in terms of bij . We do this by expressing H(u, v, z) in the
original (x, y, z) coordinates to obtain
cij =
i+j∑
k=i
N−k∑
r=i+j−k
bkr
(
k
i
)(
r
i+ j − k
)
(−1)r−j. (9)
Thus we have found the solution to all eigenvalues and eigenvectors explicitly.
Note that even though many eigenvalues are repeated, we find independent
expressions for bij for each repetition. This will give independent expressions
for cij for each independent bij that had been computed above. This suggests
that the matrix is diagonalizable, which allows us to express any distribution in
the eigenbasis of T.
4. Applications of the Spectral Solution
The solution to the spectral problem can be used to find many useful quan-
tities related to the 3-Voter model. This is because we now know the m step
propagator exactly. We can express the probability of each macrostate as:
a
(m)
ij =
∑
i′j′
di′j′λ
m
i′j′ [vi′j′ ]ij (10)
Here, [vi′j′ ]ij is the i, j component of the eigenvector corresponding to the eigen-
value λi′j′ . The coefficients di′j′ represent the initial macrostate probability dis-
tribution, a
(0)
ij , expressed in the eigenbasis. That is, we gather the eigenvectors
into a matrix V and solve Vd = a(0), where the components of d and a(0) are
di′j′ and a
(0)
ij respectively. Since T is diagonalizable, V is invertible. This form
is very convenient in the applications that follow.
4.1. Moments of Consensus Time
With the solution to the spectral problem known, we can find all moments of
the consensus time exactly. The consensus time is the number of steps required
until every node in the network has the same opinion state. Once the model
has reached consensus, the system will never leave this state. In addition to the
exact solution for the moments, we will also find an estimate of this quantity
that is independent of the initial distribution that demonstrates the asymptotic
dependence on N and the moment, p.
Let qm be the probability that the system reaches consensus at time m. The
pth moment of consensus time, τ , as a function of the initial distribution can
expressed as
E[τp|d = V−1a
(0)
] =
∞∑
m=0
qmm
p. (11)
We find the explicit form for qm to be
qm =
1
N
[a
(m−1)
1,0 + a
(m−1)
0,1 + a
(m−1)
N−1,0 + a
(m−1)
N−1,1 + a
(m−1)
0,N−1 + a
(m−1)
1,N−1]. (12)
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Apply equation (10) to express this as
qm =
1
N
N∑
i′=0
N−i′∑
j′=0
i′+j′>1
di′j′λ
m−1
i′j′ {[vi′j′ ]1,0 + [vi′j′ ]0,1
+ [vi′j′ ]N−1,0 + [vi′j′ ]N−1,1 + [vi′j′ ]0,N−1 + [vi′j′ ]1,N−1}. (13)
The sum is taken so that i′+j′ > 1 since the macrostate probabilities in equation
(12) are independent of the other eigenvectors. That is, di′j′ = 0 for i
′+ j′ ≤ 0.
This is because λi′j′ = 1 in these cases, which corresponds to the consensus
points. To simplify notation, we define si′j′ to be
si′j′ = di′j′{[vi′j′ ]1,0 + [vi′j′ ]0,1 + [vi′j′ ]N−1,0
+ [vi′j′ ]N−1,1 + [vi′j′ ]0,N−1 + [vi′j′ ]1,N−1}. (14)
Therefore, we express the moments of consensus time as
E[τp|d = V−1a
(0)
] ∼
1
N
N∑
i′=0
N−i′∑
j′=0
i′+j′>1
si′j′
p!
(1− λi′j′ )p+1
. (15)
This form for the moments of consensus time is a function of the initial dis-
tribution through the variable si′j′ defined in equation (14). The moments of
consensus time usually vary by an O(1) multiple when the initial distribution
changes. Only when the system is initially near consensus will this multiple vary
with N . If we assume this is not the case, we now seek to find the asymptotic
dependence of the moments of consensus time on N and the moment p.
Let S(m) be the probability that the system is not in consensus at time m.
This is the sum over all probabilities a
(m)
ij that do not correspond to consensus
states. These probabilities are independent of the eigenvectors with eigenvalue
λ = 1 since consensus is a frozen state. Thus, S(m) = O(λm2 ), where λ2 is the
second largest eigenvalue. Therefore, the probability of entering consensus at
time m is given by qm = S
(m−1) − S(m) = O
(
λm2
1−λ2
λ2
)
)
. Now, we substitute
this into equation (11) to obtain
E[τp] = O(p!2−pN2p) (16)
This estimate is uniform over all initial distributions and considered a func-
tion of p and N only. This result shows that the expected time to consensus
is O(N2). We reinforce this result with two Monte Carlo simulations. In the
first simulation, we fix N = 120 and run the 3 opinion Voter model over 3000
runs. Let Tp be the average of τ
p over all runs, which is the estimate of the
pth moment of consensus time. We predict that there is a linear relationship
between ln(Tp/p!) and p, and that the slope of this line is about 2 lnN − ln 2.
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Figure 1: Monte carlo simulation results for the dependence on p and N . In the top figure, we
fix N = 120 and take p = 1...10. A line with slope 2 lnN−ln 2 corresponding to the theoretical
prediction is also plotted. In the bottom figure, we fix p = 5 and let N = 10, 20, ...,120. The
line is the best fit of the data that has slope 10, which is the theoretical result we expect.
These results show good correspondence between simulated and theoretical results.
In the second simulation, we fix p = 5 and let N vary, we expect to find a linear
relationship between ln(Tp/p!) and lnN with slope 2p = 10. Figure 1 shows the
comparison between the simulated and predicted values.
4.2. Local Times
We can also apply the solution of the spectral problem to find all local times
of the 3-Voter model. We define local times to be the expected time spent at each
macrostate (nA = i, nB = j) prior to consensus. We only consider macrostates
that do not correspond to consensus states. Local times are stronger quantities
than consensus times, because the sum of all local times will be equivalent to
the expected time to consensus.
LetMij(m) be the number of times steps spent at macrostate (nA = i, nB =
j) by time m. This is a monotonically increasing random walk, where
Mij(m+ 1) = Mij(m) + ∆Mij(m). (17)
At timem, the randomness of the walk is exhibited in ∆Mij(m), which can take
values in {0, 1}. If the model is in macrostate (nA = i, nB = j) at time m+ 1,
then ∆Mij(m) = 1. This occurs with probability a
(m+1)
ij . So, we have that
E[∆Mij(m)] = a
(m+1)
ij . With this, we can find the local time for macrostate
(nA = i, nB = j):
E[Mij(∞)−Mij(0)] =
∞∑
m=0
a
(m)
ij (18)
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Figure 2: Local times of the 3-Voter model in the case when nA(0) = N/3, nB(0) = N/3 and
N = 30. The model spends most of the time at the boundary, in which the model is reduced
to the 2-Voter model.
Utilize equation (10) to obtain the exact expression for local times:
E[Mij(∞)] = N(N − 1)
N∑
i′=0
N−i′∑
j′=0
i′+j′>1
di′j′ [vi′j′ ]ij
(i′ + j′)(i′ + j′ − 1)
. (19)
We write the sum such that i′ + j′ > 1 because we do not consider consensus
states when computing local times. The macrostates we consider are indepen-
dent of the eigenvalue λ = 1, which correspond to i′+j′ = 0 or i′+j′ = 1. Figure
2 shows the local time for the 3-Voter model when nA(0) = N/3, nB(0) = N/3
and N = 30.
5. Conclusion
We have found concrete mathematical correlates for three different inter-
pretations of neutral in sociology and politics. All three mathematical models
belong to the generalized Listener Only NG and can therefore be systematically
analyzed for key statistical quantities such as expected times to multi-consensus
as in this paper.
In general, the deterministic drift in the coarse-grained or random walk mod-
els corresponding to each of these three families of NG-like models plays a key
role. With increasing slow-time drift towards points of consensus, the expected
times to consensus are decreased for most initial states. Meanwhile, such an
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increased drift against the committed minority consensus (near the consensus
point of the position without committed fraction) generally predicts a relatively
larger tipping fraction of committed minority agents, as a direct mathemat-
ical consequence of the saddle-node bifurcation on the slow-time manifold in
phase-space.
Specifically, we have given exact solutions for expected times to multi-
consensus τ in the M-models for all values of M > 2 - τ ≈ O(N2). Compared
to the corresponding times for the original LO-NG on two opinions in scenario
(c) which is O(N lnN), the strong neutrals (middle-roaders) have, as predicted
in an early section, increased the expected times to multi-consensus for large
networks. For a complete list of cases of the 2-Voter models solvable by this
generating function approach, we refer the reader to a prior paper [6].
Another conclusion that we can draw from the drift-less nature of the M
models is that there are no positive (nonzero) tipping points for committed
minority agents in any opinion type - even a very small number of committed
agents of any type will tilt the M game dynamics towards faster consensus of
that opinion. This can be viewed as a disadvantage of theM models for scenario
(b) because bloggers in a social forum of different neutral positions are unlikely
to be bowled over by extremely small numbers of committed leader-agents. In
future work, we will attempt to fix this defect.
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